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Abstract 
Vicarious perception refers to the ability to co-represent the experiences of others. Prior 
research has shown considerable inter-individual variability in vicarious perception of pain, 
with some experiencing conscious sensations of pain on their own body when viewing another 
person in pain (conscious vicarious perception / mirror-pain synaesthesia). Self-Other Theory 
proposes that this conscious vicarious perception may result from impairments in self-other 
distinction and maintaining a coherent sense of bodily self. In support of this, individuals who 
experience conscious vicarious perception are more susceptible to illusions of body ownership 
and agency. However, little work has assessed whether trait differences in bodily self-
awareness are associated with conscious vicarious pain. Here we addressed this gap by 
examining individual difference factors related to awareness of the body, in conscious vicarious 
pain responders. Increased self-reported depersonalisation and interoceptive sensibility was 
found for conscious vicarious pain responders compared with non-responders, in addition to 
more internally-oriented thinking (associated with lower alexithymia). There were no 
significant differences in trait anxiety. Results indicate that maintaining a stable sense of  the 
bodily self may be important for vicarious perception of pain, and that vicarious perception 
might also be enhanced by attention towards internal bodily states.  
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1. Introduction  
The passive observation of touch or pain experienced by another individual elicits 
vicarious activity in similar brain regions as when these sensations are experienced first-hand, 
including somatosensory and insular cortices (see Keysers, Kaas & Gazzola, 2010; Lamm, 
Decety & Singer, 2011 for reviews). This evidence has led to the assertion that one way in 
which we are able to empathise with the sensory experiences of others is by matching them 
onto representations of ourselves. Vicarious perception can therefore provide a useful model 
for studying complex social processes such as empathy (Bird & Viding, 2014). Previous 
research has identified individual variability in vicarious responses to others’ sensory 
experiences (Gillmeister, Bowling, Rigato & Banissy, 2017). For some individuals, a conscious 
percept is elicited on their own body purely from the observation of sensation experienced by 
another individual. Subtypes of this condition include mirror-touch synaesthesia (MTS) and 
conscious vicarious pain / mirror-pain synaesthesia (hereafter referred to as conscious vicarious 
pain responders). A prevalence rate of 33-34% is reported for conscious vicarious pain in 
healthy individuals, although this figure is based on liberal cut-offs (Giummarra et al., 2015; 
Osborn & Derbyshire, 2010). Grice-Jackson, Critchley, Banissy and Ward (2017) provide 
confirmation for this prevalence rate using a cluster analysis method, estimating the total 
number of responders at around 27%. This analysis also identified further sub-categories of 
vicarious pain perception. A Sensory-Localised responder group (estimated prevalence 17%) 
tended to use more sensory descriptors to describe their vicarious experience (e.g., tingling, 
stinging), and report that it was localised to the same body part as observed pain. An Affective-
Generalised group (estimated prevalence 10%) used more affective descriptors (e.g. terrifying, 
gruelling) and reported a more generalised bodily sensation that was not localised to a 
particular body part.  
While strong support for individual variability in vicarious pain has been reported, so 
far the mechanisms that underlie it are not as well understood. Explanations for the experience 
have adopted theories used to explain a related one, mirror-touch synaesthesia. In particular, 
Threshold Theory (Blakemore, Bristow, Bird, Frith & Ward, 2005; Ward & Banissy, 2015) 
proposes that conscious vicarious perception (i.e. as seen in mirror-touch synaesthesia and 
conscious vicarious pain)  is due to overactivity in brain regions involved in mirroring the states 
of others (e.g. somatosensory cortex for observed touch), which boosts vicarious brain 
activation above a threshold for conscious perception. While there is evidence for overactive 
mirroring in conscious vicarious pain responders (Grice-Jackson et al., 2017; Holle, Banissy, 
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& Ward, 2013; Osborn & Derbyshire, 2010); further evidence suggests a broader pattern of 
underlying mechanisms. Conscious vicarious pain responders (both Sensory-Localised and 
Affective-Generalised) show reduced grey matter density in the right temporo-parietal junction 
(rTPJ) compared with non-responders (Grice-Jackson et al., 2017; also see Holle et al., 2013 
for similar evidence in mirror-touch synaesthesia). This region has repeatedly been linked with 
the ability to control representations of the self and others (see Decety & Lamm, 2007; Decety 
& Sommerville, 2003; Santiesteban, Banissy, Catmur & Bird, 2012; Santiesteban, Banissy, 
Catmur & Bird, 2015). Self-Other Theory (Banissy & Ward, 2013; Ward & Banissy, 2015) 
provides an account for these broader differences, proposing that impairments in the ability to 
distinguish and switch between self- and other-relevant representations underlie conscious 
vicarious experience. Mechanisms relevant to maintaining a coherent sense of the bodily self 
also appear to be altered in conscious vicarious perception. For instance, conscious vicarious 
pain responders are more susceptible to the rubber-hand illusion (Derbyshire, Osborn & 
Brown, 2013) in which a sensation of ownership over the rubber hand is elicited without the 
synchronous tactile stimulation necessary for most participants. Recent evidence indicates that 
susceptibility to the sense of ownership on the rubber-hand illusion may be increased only for 
Sensory-Localised responders, and not the Affective-Generalised subgroup (Botan, Fan, 
Critchley & Ward, 2018). These results indicate greater plasticity of bodily self-awareness 
associated with conscious vicarious pain (but perhaps limited to Sensory-Localised 
responders). Further research is needed to establish the extent to which the sense of self is 
altered across conscious vicarious pain responders. 
While the evidence above points towards atypical representations of the bodily self in 
individuals who experience conscious vicarious pain, there has thus far been little investigation 
into the extent to which traits related to bodily self-awareness differ between these individuals 
and those who do not experience conscious vicarious sensations. The current study sought to 
address this gap in the literature by examining trait differences in four constructs previously 
linked to the subjective sense of bodily self-awareness: depersonalisation, interoceptive 
sensibility, alexithymia and anxiety. Below we explain why each of these factors may be of 
theoretical interest for bodily self-awareness and conscious vicarious pain. 
Depersonalisation is a clinical trait characterised by a feeling of detachment from one’s 
own bodily self (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). In a recent study by Adler and 
colleagues (2016) individuals with high self-reported depersonalisation showed differences in 
vicarious tactile perception. Specifically, early somatosensory-evoked potential components 
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distinguished images of the participant’s own face being touched (P45) from another face 
(N80), and later components (P200) were attenuated in the own-face condition compared with 
the other-face. This distinction between self and other in vicarious somatosensory response was 
not present for individuals with high levels of depersonalisation. This indicates that 
depersonalisation is associated with reduced self-other distinction, which, as proposed by Ward 
and Banissy (2015) may play a key role in vicarious tactile perception. Individuals with higher 
levels of depersonalisation are also more susceptible to the rubber hand illusion (Kanayama, 
Sato & Ohira, 2009), suggesting that this construct might be interesting to examine in conscious 
vicarious pain responders, given prior work highlighting altered body ownership in the rubber 
hand illusion for this group (Botan et al., 2018; Derbyshire et al., 2013). 
Interoception refers to the awareness and perception of one’s own internal bodily states 
(Brewer, Cook & Bird, 2016). Recent work has proposed three distinct components to 
interoception (Garfinkel, Seth, Barrett, Suzuki and Critchley, 2015), namely interoceptive 
accuracy (the ability to accurately detect internal sensations, e.g., heartbeats), interoceptive 
sensibility (self-perception of this trait, e.g., reporting a focus on internal sensations), and 
interoceptive awareness (the metacognitive awareness of one’s own interoceptive accuracy, 
e.g., knowing that you can accurately detect your own heartbeat). Detecting pain in one’s own 
body is a key aspect of interoception (Craig, 2002). The chronic pain literature also indicates a 
link between pain, emotion and interoception. A recent study by Borg and colleagues (2018) 
finds that interoceptive accuracy is predicted by ‘pain-related affect and reactions’ in 
fibromyalgia patients, whereby more intense pain experience decreased interoceptive accuracy. 
Further, interoceptive sensibility was higher for individuals with more intense affective 
experience, suggesting a relationship between interoception and the affective qualities of pain. 
There is currently no direct evidence examining interoception in conscious vicarious pain 
responders, but neuroanatomical evidence links interoception with perceptions of others’ pain. 
Several studies have identified the insular cortex as a key region in interoceptive processing 
(e.g., Craig, 2009; Critchley, Wiens, Rotshtein, Öhman & Dolan, 2004), and, as mentioned 
above, the insula (particularly anterior regions) is also involved in both the direct experience 
and passive observation of pain (e.g. Bird et al., 2010). Conscious vicarious pain responders 
show greater activity in anterior insula (AI) when viewing another person in pain (Osborn & 
Derbyshire, 2010), as well as increased grey matter density in AI compared with non-
responders (Grice-Jackson et al., 2017). Structural and functional differences in this region may 
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therefore be a contributing factor in these individuals’ conscious responses to others’ pain, but 
may also lead to differences in interoceptive processing.  
Complementing earlier work on depersonalisation, which is associated with a reduction 
in bodily self-awareness, individuals with lower interoceptive accuracy are also more 
susceptible to illusions of body ownership, including the rubber hand (Tsakiris, Tajadura-
Jiménez & Costantini, 2011) and enfacement illusions (Tajadura-Jiménez & Tsakiris, 2014). 
An implication of this is that vicarious pain perception may also be associated with reduced 
interoception in addition to higher depersonalisation. Although, at present there does not appear 
to be a direct relation between interoception and depersonalisation: Sedeño and colleagues 
(2014) report reduced interoceptive accuracy for a single case study of an individual with 
depersonalisation disorder, while Michal and colleagues (2014) find comparable interoceptive 
accuracy and sensibility in a larger sample of participants with high depersonalisation. Of 
particular relevance to the present studies, individuals with higher interoceptive accuracy show 
greater difficulty in inhibiting the imitation of others’ actions when required (Ainley, Brass & 
Tsakiris, 2014). Prior work has indicated that imitation-inhibition is impaired in MTS 
(Santiesteban, Bird, Tew, Cioffi & Banissy, 2015), and it has been suggested that similar 
difficulties may be observed in conscious vicarious pain (Ward & Banissy, 2015; Derbyshire 
et al 2013). In addition, Grynberg and Pollatos (2015) report a link between higher 
interoceptive accuracy and greater empathy for pain.  
The majority of previous work relevant to the relation between interoception and 
vicarious perception has relied on measures of interoceptive accuracy, and of these most have 
used those based on cardiac signals (e.g. heartbeat detection, Schandry, 1981). As noted, there 
are, however, at least three distinct components to interoception (Garfinkel, Seth, Barrett, 
Suzuki and Critchley, 2015). There is therefore a need to expand this work to address other 
components of interoception (i.e. sensibility, awareness). Research has demonstrated that 
interoceptive accuracy and sensibility are not necessarily correlated (Garfinkel et al., 2015). 
With this in mind, assessing interoceptive sensibility in conscious vicarious pain responders is 
of theoretical interest, and there is a need to identify the nature of any trait differences in 
interoception which may exist in conscious vicarious pain, since previous evidence leads to 
contradictory predictions (i.e., either improved or impaired interoceptive processing in this 
group).  
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Alexithymia is a subclinical trait encompassing difficulties with identifying and 
describing emotions, as well as a tendency to reduce emotional experiences and focus attention 
externally (Bagby, Parker & Taylor, 1994). Past research has shown that alexithymia is 
associated with impaired interoceptive accuracy (Herbert, Herbert & Pollatos, 2011; Shah, 
Hall, Catmur & Bird, 2016), but increased interoceptive sensibility (i.e., a greater focus on 
internal sensations; Ernst et al., 2014) as measured on the Body Perception Questionnaire 
(Porges, 1993). There is also evidence to suggest that individuals high in alexithymia show 
reduced imitation (e.g. on imitation-inhibition tasks; Sowden et al., 2016) and reduced activity 
in neural networks linked to empathy for pain (Bird et al., 2010). This contrasts with the profile 
of conscious vicarious perception, where increased imitation (e.g. hyper-imitation in imitation-
inhibition tasks found in mirror-touch synaesthesia; Santiesteban et al., 2015) and greater 
activity in neural networks associated with empathy for pain in conscious vicarious pain 
responders have been reported (Osborn & Derbyshire, 2010; Grice-Jackson et al., 2017). 
Studying alexithymia in conscious various pain responders is therefore of importance, as based 
on current literature a prediction of lower alexithymia and heightened interoception in 
individuals that experience conscious vicarious pain would be expected. 
Conscious vicarious pain response has previously been linked with increased trait 
anxiety, as measured on the Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (Antony, Bieling, Cox, Enns, & 
Swinson, 1998; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995; Nazarewicz, Verdejo-Garcia, & Giummarra, 
2015; Young, Gandevia, & Giummarra, 2017). In the experiment by Young and colleagues, 
conscious vicarious pain responders also demonstrated suppression of physiological responses 
(slowing respiratory rate) in response to observed pain, indicative of avoidance of the 
threatening stimulus. The authors therefore suggest that vicarious pain sensation may be 
heightened by anticipatory anxiety prior to viewing a painful event. Indeed, evidence of motor 
inhibition when viewing others in pain (e.g. Avenanti, Bueti, Galati & Aglioti, 2005) indicates 
that vicarious pain perception is important for predicting and preventing potential harm to the 
self.  Previous literature has also indicated a link between anxiety and interoception, although 
the nature of the relation between these constructs remains unclear. Neuroimaging evidence, 
for instance, has shown that the size and reactivity of AI (a region also associated with vicarious 
pain response, as discussed above) is linked to both heartbeat detection and to the general 
experience of anxiety symptoms (Paulus & Stein, 2006; Stein, Simmons, Feinstein & Paulus, 
2007). At the behavioural level, there is evidence for increased interoceptive accuracy on 
heartbeat detection tasks for participants with higher trait anxiety (Dunn et al., 2010; Pollatos, 
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Herbert, Matthias & Schandry, 2007; Stevens et al., 2011), indicating that anxious individuals 
can more accurately monitor their own heartbeats. However, this effect is not consistent, and 
other studies have reported either no such improvement, or even poorer accuracy (Borg et al., 
2018; De Pascalis, Alberti & Pandolfo. 1984; Ehlers, Margraf, Roth, Taylor & Birbaumer, 
1988). Catastrophic misinterpretation of bodily sensations is thought to play a role in anxiety 
disorders, particularly panic disorder (Clarke et al., 1997), suggesting that anxious individuals 
pay greater attention to their internal bodily signals (even if their perception is no more 
accurate). However, in terms of self-reported interoceptive sensibility, evidence again is 
inconsistent. While high anxiety has been associated with greater interoceptive sensibility 
(Garfinkel et al., 2016; Olatunji, Deacon, Abramowitz & Valentiner, 2007), others have 
reported reduced awareness of bodily signals (Brown et al., 2017; Mallorquí-Bagué et al., 2014; 
Mehling et al., 2012). Alexithymia has also been associated with high anxiety (Hendryx, 
Haviland & Shaw, 1991), adding further complication to current understanding, since 
alexithymia is typically associated with poor interoceptive accuracy (Herbert et al., 2011; Shah 
et al., 2016; see above). Regarding the inter-relation between the three constructs, Palser and 
colleagues (2018) suggest that the relation between interoceptive sensibility and anxiety may 
be mediated by alexithymia. This provides a partial explanation for previous inconsistencies, 
where increased interoceptive sensibility may only result in greater anxiety where there is also 
alexithymia, which may lead to a difficulty connecting bodily sensations to emotional states. 
Overall, this complex literature highlights the need for further research to clarify the relation 
between vicarious perception, anxiety, interoception and alexithymia.  
To summarise, prior literature suggests that there may be trait differences associated 
with vicarious pain, which have thus far not been studied in conscious vicarious pain 
responders. Here, the aim was to identify differences in self-reported traits relevant to 
subjective bodily and emotional self-awareness in conscious vicarious pain responders for the 
first time. This was carried out with a view to understanding the broader traits associated with 
conscious vicarious pain, and informing theoretical explanations of the condition. Participants 
were categorised into one of three responder groups: non-responders (controls), Sensory-
Localised responders, and Affective-Generalised responders. Prior work indicates that both 
conscious responder subgroups (Sensory-Localised and Affective-Generalised) show 
structural and functional brain differences in regions associated with self-other control and 
bodily self-awareness. Based on this evidence, both groups were predicted to show the same 
pattern of differences across the four measured constructs, compared with non-responders. 
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Comparison of trait differences in the two subgroups will nevertheless be important for 
informing theoretical accounts of conscious vicarious pain, identifying the extent to which 
atypical bodily self-awareness might be specific to Sensory-Localised responders (see Botan 
et al., 2018) or common to all conscious responders. On the basis of previous research, 
conscious vicarious pain responders (Sensory-Localised and Affective-Generalised) were 
predicted to report higher depersonalisation, interoceptive sensibility and trait anxiety, but 
lower levels of alexithymia.  
 
2. Materials and Methods 
2.1. Participants 
In total 608 participants (465F, 138M; age 18-66 years, M = 23.4, SD = 7.8) took part 
in the experiment. This comprised a non-responder group (N = 432; 328F, 104M; age M = 23.7, 
SD = 8.3), who did not tend to report conscious vicarious experiences, a Sensory-Localised 
responder group (N = 106; 85F, 21M; age M = 22.4, SD = 5.6) who tended to report conscious 
vicarious experiences localised to the same body part as the observed stimulus, and use sensory 
descriptors, and an Affective-Generalised responder group (N = 70; 56F, 14M; age M = 23.1, 
SD = 7.5), who tended to report conscious vicarious experiences more generalised over the 
whole body, and to use more affective than sensory descriptors.  Responder groups did not 
significantly differ in age (F [2,604] = 1.36, p = .258, ɳp² < .01) or gender (χ² [2] = 1.24, p 
=.537). Normal or corrected-to-normal vision was required to participate. Five participants 
were removed prior to the analysis of depersonalisation data, since their total scores on the 
Cambridge Depersonalisation Scale were found to be extreme outliers, being more than 3 times 
the interquartile range above the upper quartile of the data (range of excluded scores 202-269).  
 
2.2. Procedure 
Testing was conducted online using Qualtrics survey software. All participants 
completed the Vicarious Pain Questionnaire (VPQ; Grice-Jackson et al., 2017) to assess and 
categorise their vicarious pain response. Participants also completed the Cambridge 
Depersonalisation Scale (CDS; Sierra & Berrios, 2000) to measure depersonalisation, the 
Multidimensional Assessment of Interoceptive Awareness (MAIA; Mehling, 2012) to examine 
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interoceptive sensibility, the Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20; Bagby et al., 1994) as a 
measure of alexithymia, and the trait component of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-
T; Spielberger, 1983) to assess trait anxiety. Data was collected across three recruitment 
phases. In one phase participants completed all self-report scales in one online questionnaire 
(n = 102). In a second phase participants first completed the VPQ, CDS, MAIA and TAS-20 
in one questionnaire (n = 186), and 14 of these participants also completed the STAI-T in a 
later session. In a third phase participants who had previously completed the VPQ were 
recruited to complete the CDS (n = 320).  
 
2.2.1. Vicarious Pain Questionnaire  
To examine the subjective experience of vicarious pain, participants were required to 
view 16 short (10-13 second) videos of painful events occurring to another person. Videos were 
displayed in pseudo-random order. Eight of these videos portrayed sports injuries (e.g., a cyclist 
falling from a bike) and eight showed injections to various parts of the body. Videos were 
obtained with permission from Grice-Jackson and colleagues (2017), and can be viewed using 
this link https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCT8goTgWGRsu14NjVaPCSGw/videos. After each 
video participants were asked “Did you experience any bodily sensation of pain whilst 
observing the [e.g., arm injection]?” All participants were also asked to rate “How unpleasant 
did you find the experience of watching this video?” on a 10-point scale from 1 (not unpleasant) 
to 10 (highly unpleasant). If the response was ‘yes’, three further questions appeared. As for 
the touch videos, participants were asked to rate the intensity and the location (generalised vs. 
localised) of the vicarious pain they experienced. Finally, participants could select up to 23 
descriptive words (10 affective, 10 sensory, 3 cognitive) from the McGill Pain Questionnaire 
(Melzack, 1975) to describe their experience. If the participant felt that none were appropriate 
there was also an option to add their own words. 
 
2.3. Self-Report Measures 
2.3.1. Cambridge Depersonalisation Scale 
The Cambridge Depersonalisation Scale (CDS; Sierra & Berrios, 2000) was 
administered to assess depersonalisation symptoms experienced in the past six months. 
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Participants are presented with 29 statements, such as “Parts of my body feel as if they didn’t 
belong to me” and should rate the frequency of this experience on a five-point scale from 
“never” to “all the time”. Unless the participant responds “Never”, they then rate the typical 
duration of the experience, on a six-point scale from “few seconds” to “more than a week”. 
Possible scores range between 0 and 290, with higher scores indicating greater 
depersonalisation. Sierra and Berrios report good internal consistency (α = .89) and excellent 
split-half reliability (α = .92) for the scale as well as good validity, shown in a specific 
correlation (r = .80) with the depersonalisation subscale of the Dissociative Experiences Scale 
(Bernstein & Putnam, 1986). High internal consistency was also found in the current sample 
(α = .96). 
 
2.3.2. Multidimensional Assessment of Interoceptive Awareness 
Interoceptive sensibility was measured using the Multidimensional Assessment of 
Interoceptive Awareness (MAIA; Mehling et al., 2012). The scale contains 32 items, including 
“When I am tense I notice where the tension is located in my body”. Participants respond to 
indicate the extent to which the statement applies to them, on a six-point scale from “never” to 
“always”. Scores can be combined into eight subscales, including Noticing: “awareness of 
uncomfortable, comfortable and neutral body sensations”;  Not-Distracting: “tendency to 
ignore or distract oneself from sensations of pain or discomfort” (reversed), Not Worrying: 
“emotional distress or worry with sensations of pain or discomfort” (reversed), Attention 
Regulation: “ability to sustain and control attention to body sensation”, Emotional Awareness: 
“awareness of the connection between body sensations and emotional states”, Self-Regulation: 
“ability to regulate psychological distress by attention to body sensations”, Body Listening: 
“actively listens to the body for insight”, and Trusting: “experiences one’s body as safe and 
trustworthy”. Scores on each subscale can range between 0 and 5, with a higher score indicating 
greater interoceptive awareness. Mehling and colleagues demonstrate construct validity for the 
scale and acceptable to good internal consistency on five of the eight subscales (α = .79 - .87). 
However, they note that for the Noticing, Not-Distracting, and Not-Worrying subscales internal 
consistency was lower (α = .66 - .69) Similar results are reported in the current sample, with 
good internal consistency on five subscales (α = .84 - .86), and more questionable internal 
consistency on the Not-Distracting (α = .69) and Not-Worrying (α = .62) subscales, although 
for the Noticing subscale, internal consistency was acceptable (α = .73).  
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2.3.3. Toronto Alexithymia Scale 
Alexithymia was assessed with the twenty item Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20; 
Bagby et al., 1994). The questionnaire requires participants to indicate the extent which they 
agree with each of 20 statements on a five-point scale from “strongly disagree” to “strongly 
agree.” Three subscales represent Difficulty Describing Feelings, e.g, “It is difficult for me to 
find the right words for my feelings”, Difficulty Identifying Feelings, e.g., “I am often confused 
about what emotion I am feeling”, and Externally-Oriented Thinking, e.g., “Looking for hidden 
meanings in movies or plays distracts from their enjoyment”. Total scores range from 20 to 80, 
with a higher score representing greater alexithymia. Bagby and colleagues confirm the validity 
of the three-factor structure and report acceptable internal consistency for the Difficulty 
Describing Feelings (α = .75) and Difficulty Identifying Feelings (α = .78) subscales, although 
reliability for Externally-Oriented Thinking was slightly lower (α = .66). The same pattern of 
results is found in the present sample (α = .61 - .83). 
 
2.3.4 State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
The State–Trait anxiety inventory (STAI; Spielberger, 1983) is a 40-item scale which 
assesses both state and trait anxiety. In the present study, only the 20 trait anxiety items from 
the STAI-T were presented. This assesses the dispositional, or more stable, trait of anxiety 
proneness. It contains items such as “I feel nervous and restless” or “I feel satisfied with 
myself”. Respondents are asked to indicate to what degree the item describes their feelings on 
a 4-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 = not at all and 4 = very much so. Total scores range 
from 20-80, where a higher score indicates greater trait anxiety. Spielberger reports that the 
STAI-T is reliable and valid, with internal consistency of α = .90. Excellent internal consistency 
is also found in the current sample (α = .93). 
 
2.4. Analysis Protocol 
Participants were assigned to pain responder groups on the basis of their responses on 
the VPQ, using a two-step cluster analysis based on the procedure used by Botan and 
colleagues (2018; see also Zhang et al., 1996). This involves an initial clustering of participants 
to produce cluster centroids, and then categorises participants into groups based on these 
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centroids. Since this method produces optimal results using large data sets, data was combined 
with previous VPQ responses from Grice-Jackson and colleagues (2017). The first step 
comprised a hierarchical cluster analysis using Ward’s method (Ward, 1963) to identify the 
number of clusters and cluster centroids. This was based on three input variables: 1) Mean pain 
intensity (the average intensity rating across all 16 videos), 2) Sensory-Affective (the total 
number of sensory descriptors used to describe the pain – the total number affective descriptors, 
and 3) Local-General (the total number of localised pain responses – the total number of 
generalised responses). This step confirmed a three-factor solution, in line with prior work 
(Grice-Jackson et al., 2017; Botan et al., 2018). The second step involved a non-hierarchical k-
means cluster analysis, which assigned participants into one of the three groups, based on the 
cluster centroids from the first step. Botan and colleagues report good test-retest reliability for 
the VPQ and for the clustering methods employed in the current paper. 
 Between-group differences on the remaining self-report scales ( CDS, MAIA, TAS and 
STAI-T) were then analysed . Univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) was applied to the 
CDS (including total scores, frequency and duration of experiences) and STAI-T to identify 
between-group effects of vicarious pain response on these scales. Where there were subscales 
of theoretical interest (MAIA and TAS), multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was 
used to assess the effect of pain responder group across subscales. Post-hoc pairwise 
comparisons were conducted using Tukey’s HSD where significant group effects were found, 
with the exception of the CDS. The distribution of CDS scores showed a significant positive 
skew (z = 11.69). This pattern is typical for the CDS when administered in the general 
population rather than clinical groups (Sierra & Berrios, 2000). Due to this distribution of the 
data bootstrapped t-tests (two-tailed, 1000 repetitions) were used to conduct post-hoc 
comparisons on the CDS. Additionally, Pearson’s correlations were used to identify the relation 
between all of the above self-report measures, and Harman’s single factor test was used to 
examine potential common-method variance.  
 
3. Results 
3.1. Relationships Between Trait Measures 
Correlations between trait measures are reported in Table 1. Higher depersonalisation 
was associated with higher scores on the Describing Feelings and Identifying Feelings 
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subscales of the TAS. Positive correlations were also observed between depersonalisation and 
components of interoceptive sensibility, specifically Noticing, Emotional Awareness and Body 
Listening subscales. Negative correlations, however, were found between depersonalisation 
and the Not-Distracting, as well as Not-Worrying subscales. No significant correlation was 
found between depersonalisation and trait anxiety. Between alexithymia and interoceptive 
sensibility, negative correlations were observed for the majority of subscales, indicating a 
general association between lower interoceptive sensibility and higher alexithymia. Increased 
trait anxiety was also associated with greater alexithymia on the Identifying and Describing 
Feelings subscales. There were also significant negative correlations between anxiety and 
interoceptive sensibility on the Self-Regulation and Trusting subscales. 
The only self-report trait measure found to significantly correlate with age was 
depersonalisation, where older participants tended to report less depersonalisation (r [600] = -
.131, p = .001). All other correlations with age were not significant (ps > .08). Gender 
differences were also observed in the data. With a Bonferroni-corrected alpha level of p < .004, 
significant effects of gender were found on the Not-Worrying (t [286] = 4.28, p < .001, Cohen’s 
d = 0.57), Attention Regulation (t [286] = 3.37, p = .001, Cohen’s d = 0.46) and Trusting (t 
[286] = 3.71, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.51) subscales of the MAIA. In all cases male participants 
scored higher than females, indicating greater interoceptive sensibility. 
To estimate common-method variance in the current data set, Harman’s single factor 
test (Harman, 1976) was carried out. A principal components method was used to load all 
experimental variables onto a single factor, in order to calculate shared variance. This is 
generally thought to be problematic if a single factor can account for the majority of the 
covariance in the data (see Podsakoff, Mackenzie, Lee & Podsakoff, 2003). The analysis 
resulted in a single factor that accounted for 25.4% of the covariance, well below that 
considered to be problematic, and 14 factors with eigenvalues greater than 1. 
 
3.2. Trait Differences associated with Vicarious Pain 
3.2.1. Depersonalisation 
To examine depersonalisation across the three pain responder groups (Sensory-
Localised vs. Affective-Generalised vs. Non-Responder), a univariate ANOVA was carried out 
on total CDS scores. The main effect of responder group was significant (F [2,600] = 5.02, p 
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= .007, ɳp² =.02). Bootstrapped t-tests (two-tailed, 1000 repetitions) revealed significantly 
greater depersonalisation in Sensory-Localised responders compared with non-responders (t 
[533] = 2.15, p = .032, Cohen’s d = 0.24), with bootstrapped analysis also significant (p = .024, 
CI: 0.36, 12.33). Affective-Generalised responders also reported higher depersonalisation than 
non-responders (t [78] = 2.09, p = .040, Cohen’s d = 0.30), and bootstrapped analysis also 
reporting a significant effect (p = .048, CI: 0.90, 22.12). No significant differences were found 
between Sensory-Localised and Affective-Generalised responders (t [106] = 0.72, p = .473, 
Cohen’s d = 0.12). Mean CDS scores are displayed in Figure 1. 
Two further univariate ANOVAs were used to identify whether between-group 
differences above reflected differences in the frequency or duration of depersonalisation 
experiences. Significant effects of pain responder group were found on both frequency (F 
[2,600] = 3.46, p = .032, ɳp² =.01) and duration (F [2,600] = 5.63, p = .004, ɳp² =.02) responses 
of the CDS. However, post-hoc comparisons show that although the frequency of 
depersonalisation symptoms was increased compared with non-responders, this did not reach 
significance for Sensory-Localised (t [533] = 1.43, p = .155, Cohen’s d = 0.15) or Affective-
Generalised (t [77] = 1.84, p = .070, Cohen’s d = 0.27) groups. There was also no significant 
difference found between Sensory-Localised and Affective-Generalised responders (t [101] = 
0.93, p = .357, Cohen’s d = 0.15). In terms of duration, Sensory-Localised responders reported 
longer lasting experiences than non-responders (t [533] = 2.48, p = .013, Cohen’s d = 0.27), 
with bootstrapped analysis also significant (p = .017, CI: 0.83, 8.76). The duration of Affective-
Generalised responders’ experiences was also longer than non-responders (t [79] = 2.19, p = 
.032, Cohen’s d = 0.31), and bootstrapped analysis was also significant (p = .039, CI: 0.19, 
13.62). No significant difference in duration was found between Sensory-Localised and 
Affective-Generalised responders (t [171] = 0.56, p = .575, Cohen’s d = 0.08). 
 
Figure 1 about here (CDS scores by pain cluster) 
 
3.2.2. Interoceptive Sensibility 
Differences in interoceptive sensibility between the pain responder groups were 
analysed using MANOVA. Each of the eight subscales of the MAIA were entered as dependent 
variables in the analysis, with pain responder group (Sensory-Localised vs. Affective-
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Generalised vs. Non-Responders) as the independent variable. The analysis showed a 
significant effect of pain responder group on MAIA scores (F [16,558] = 2.72, p < .001, ɳp² 
=.07).  Using a Bonferroni-corrected alpha level of p < .006, significant effects were found on 
four of the eight subscales: Noticing (F [2,285] = 10.79, p < .001, ɳp² =.07), Not-Distracting (F 
[2,285] = 6.32, p = .002, ɳp² =.04), Emotional Awareness (F [2,285] = 9.94, p < .001, ɳp² =.07), 
and Body-Listening (F [2,285] = 6.43, p = .002, ɳp² =.04). Effects for all other subscales did 
not reach significance (p > .017). 
Post-hoc pairwise comparisons, using Tukey’s HSD were carried out for each subscale. 
The Noticing subscale demonstrated significantly higher scores for both Sensory-Localised 
responders (t [253] = 4.15, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.71) and Affective-Generalised responders 
(t [241] = 2.71, p = .019, Cohen’s d = 0.50) compared with non-responders. No significant 
difference was found between the Sensory-Localised and Affective-Generalised responder 
groups (t [76] = 0.76, p = .730, Cohen’s d = 0.18). On the Emotional Awareness subscale, again 
both Sensory-Localised (t [253] = 3.78, p = .001, Cohen’s d = 0.60) and Affective-Generalised 
(t [241] = 2.91, p = .011, Cohen’s d = 0.58) responders gained higher scores than non-
responders, while there was no significant difference between the two responder groups (t [76] 
= 0.33, p = .941, Cohen’s d = 0.08). On the Body-Listening subscale, only the scores of 
Affective-Generalised responders were higher than non-responders (t [241] = 3.35, p = .003, 
Cohen’s d = 0.61). No significant difference was found between Sensory-Localised responders 
and non-responders (t [253] = 1.76, p = .184, Cohen’s d = 0.28), or between Sensory-Localised 
and Affective-Generalised responders (t [76] = -1.48, p = .302, Cohen’s d = -0.30). Finally, on 
the Not-Distracting subscale, again only Affective-Generalised responders significantly 
differed from non-responders (t [241] = -3.37, p = .002, Cohen’s d = -0.60), however, on this 
subscale, scores were lower in the Affective-Generalised group. No significant difference was 
observed between Sensory-Localised responders and non-responders (t [253] = -1.65, p = .228, 
Cohen’s d = -0.29), or between Sensory-Localised and Affective-Generalised responders (t 
[79] = 1.57, p = .260, Cohen’s d = 0.37). Means for all subscales described above are displayed 
in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 about here (MAIA scores by pain cluster) 
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3.2.3. Alexithymia 
TAS scores in each of the pain responder groups were also compared using MANOVA. 
There was a significant effect of responder group on alexithymia scores (F [6,568] = 3.12, p = 
.005, ɳp² =.03). Looking at each subscale individually, significant differences were found on 
the Externally-Oriented Thinking subscale (F [2,285] = 7.28, p = .001, ɳp² =.05), but not on the 
Identifying (F [2,285] = 0.09, p = .914, ɳp² < .01) or Describing Feelings (F [2,285] = 1.03, p 
= .358, ɳp² = .01) subscales. Post-hoc comparisons using Tukey’s HSD demonstrated lower 
scores on the Externally-Oriented Thinking Subscale for both Sensory-Localised (t [253] = -
2.707, p = .020, Cohen’s d = -0.45) and Affective-Generalised responders (t [241] = -3.08, p = 
.006, Cohen’s d = -0.60) compared with non-responders (means are displayed in Figure 3). No 
significant difference was found between Sensory-Localised and Affective-Generalised 
responders (t [76] = 0.58, p = .828, Cohen’s d = 0.15). 
 
Figure 3 about here (TAS scores by pain cluster) 
 
3.2.4 Trait Anxiety 
Univariate ANOVA compared trait anxiety scores on the STAI-T in each vicarious pain 
responder group. The results showed no significant difference in anxiety (F [2, 113] = 1.70, p 
= .188, ɳp² = .03) between the Sensory-Localised responder group (M = 49.37, SD = 10.97), 
the Affective-Generalised responder group (M = 43.88, SD = 11.33) and non-responders (M = 
47.29, SD = 11.67). 
 
4. Discussion 
The present study provides evidence of heightened depersonalisation and interoceptive 
sensibility, as well as lower externally-oriented thinking (an alexithymic trait) associated with 
conscious vicarious pain. These differences were found in both Sensory-Localised and 
Affective-Generalised responders across all traits, with the exception of the Body Listening 
and Not-Distracting subscales of interoceptive sensibility. However, no differences in trait 
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anxiety levels were found between groups. The findings support hypotheses that conscious 
vicarious pain perception is associated with atypical bodily self-awareness. 
The initial prediction that conscious vicarious perception would be associated with 
increased depersonalisation, as measured on the CDS, was supported. Sensory-Localised and 
Affective-Generalised responders reported greater experience of depersonalisation symptoms 
than non-responders. This result is in line with prior research linking both depersonalisation 
(Adler et al., 2016; Kanayama et al., 2009) and conscious vicarious pain perception (Derbyshire 
et al., 2013; Grice-Jackson et al., 2017) with impairments in self-other distinction and a 
tendency towards self-other merging of body-relevant information. No differences in 
depersonalisation were found between the two subgroups of conscious vicarious responders. 
This is of interest, given that previous research has indicated bodily self-other blurring may be 
limited to the Sensory-Localised group (Botan et al., 2018). This prior work found increased 
susceptibility to the rubber-hand illusion in Sensory-Localised responders, indicating a 
tendency for this group (but not Affective-Generalised responders or controls) to incorporate 
other bodies into their own-body representations. While the rubber-hand paradigm and the CDS 
both capture the stability of body representations; they reflect different aspects of this construct. 
Observed differences on the rubber-hand illusion relate to increased attribution of ownership 
over another body, but depersonalisation relates to a loss of ownership over the bodily self. In 
this case it may be that both subgroups of conscious vicarious responders experience 
detachment from the self, but only Sensory-Localised responders experience increased 
ownership over other body parts. 
The present results also demonstrate increased interoceptive sensibility in conscious 
vicarious pain responders compared with non-responders. For both Sensory-Localised and 
Affective-Generalised groups, this difference was present on the Noticing subscale of the 
MAIA (Mehling et al., 2012), which refers to the “awareness of uncomfortable, comfortable 
and neutral body sensations” (p10) and the Emotional Awareness subscale, which Mehling and 
colleagues describe as the “awareness of the connection between body sensations and 
emotional states” (p10). Interestingly, these two subscales were both found to be positively 
correlated with affective intensity in a study by Borg and colleagues (2018), indicating that 
increased interoceptive sensibility in conscious vicarious pain responders may be related to 
their heightened affective experiences. Affective-Generalised responders also obtained higher 
scores on the Body-Listening subscale, which refers to the extent to which the participant 
“actively listens to the body for insight” (p10), but lower scores on the Not-Distracting 
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subscale, suggesting that these individuals have a greater “tendency to ignore or distract oneself 
from sensations of pain or discomfort” (p10). Compared with Noticing and Emotional 
Awareness, these two components more reflect the regulation of interoception, indicating that 
the Affective-Generalised group have a greater tendency to try to direct attention towards or 
away from their body sensations, according to the positive or negative valence of these 
sensations.  This finding provides a potential explanation for the generalised body sensations 
experienced by this group. Where Affective-Generalised responders are more likely to distract 
themselves from sensations of pain, they may find it more difficult to localise the origin of 
discomfort on their own body, compared with Sensory-Localised responders. Since this result 
was contrary to the predictions of the current study, the suggestion requires further 
investigation, but the results provide novel insight into the mechanisms behind different 
expressions of conscious vicarious perception. 
Taken together, the results regarding interoceptive sensibility indicate a greater 
tendency for conscious vicarious pain responders to focus and control attention towards their 
internal bodily states and emotions. The results complement previous work reporting an 
association between interoceptive accuracy and difficulty inhibiting imitation, in the motor 
domain (Ainley et al., 2014), as well as work linking both interoception and vicarious 
perception in typical adults to activity in AI (Craig, 2009; Critchley et al., 2004; Grice-Jackson 
et al., 2017; Osborn & Derbyshire, 2010). However, it is important to note the distinction 
between interoceptive sensibility and accuracy. High interoceptive sensibility, referring to the 
tendency to focus on internal bodily states, does not necessarily imply accuracy, the ability to 
correctly identify these states (Garfinkel et al., 2015). Previous work has mostly used heartbeat 
detection tasks of interoceptive accuracy (e.g., Schandry, 1981), and therefore the present 
results provide interesting evidence regarding a less-studied domain of interoception. Further 
research is required to establish whether observed differences associated with conscious 
vicarious pain extend to interoceptive accuracy. This can be achieved using the classic 
heartbeat detection paradigm, but measures of other bodily signals (e.g. respiratory, muscular, 
see Garfinkel et al., 2016; Murphy, Catmur & Bird, 2018) should also be used to examine 
interoceptive accuracy across the whole body. 
In addition to interoceptive sensibility and depersonalisation, both Sensory-Localised 
and Affective-Generalised responders were found to show significantly lower externally-
oriented thinking (a subscale of the Toronto Alexithymia Scale) than non-responders.  In other 
words, more internally-oriented thinking (consistent with the MAIA) and less alexithymia.  
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Alexithymia is another factor relevant to bodily self-awareness. Recent research has proposed 
that difficulties identifying and describing emotions may be caused by a lack of ability to 
correctly monitor body sensations (Herbert et al., 2011; Shah et al., 2016). Alexithymia is also 
associated with reduced activity in AI in response to others’ pain (Bird et al., 2010) and so 
conscious vicarious pain responders appear to lie at the opposite end of this spectrum, showing 
lower levels of alexithymic traits, and increased vicarious representation of others’ pain.  
Osborn and Derbyshire (2010) report that conscious vicarious pain responders show greater 
activity in AI than non-responders when observing others’ pain. Moreover, both Sensory-
Localised and Affective-Generalised responders also show increased grey matter density in 
this region (Grice-Jackson et al., 2017). Atypical structure and activity in AI may therefore 
underlie differences in bodily self-awareness, alexithymia and vicarious perception observed 
in conscious vicarious pain responders in the present study. As mentioned above, a similar 
pattern of trait depersonalisation, interoceptive sensibility and alexithymia in both Sensory-
Localised and Affective-Generalised responders suggests that atypical bodily awareness is 
common across conscious vicarious pain responder subtypes. The specific difference in 
externally-oriented thinking indicates that while conscious vicarious pain responders are no 
better than non-responders at identifying or describing their own emotions, they have a reduced 
tendency to focus their attention externally. This is in line with results showing increased 
interoceptive sensibility in this group, and suggests a greater focus on internal bodily 
sensations, not only for the self but for others. While items on the interoceptive sensibility scale 
relate only to one’s own body, on the externally-oriented thinking subscale conscious vicarious 
pain responders were less likely to endorse items such as “I prefer talking to people about their 
daily activities than their feelings”, suggesting that the internal and affective experience of 
others is also a greater focus for conscious vicarious pain responders. Whether this is a causal 
factor in conscious vicarious pain experience or comes as a result of avoiding potentially 
painful or distressing external stimuli (e.g. when seeing another person in pain) remains to be 
clarified. 
The collective evidence of altered bodily and emotional self-awareness in conscious 
vicarious pain responders adds to growing evidence that individuals who experience conscious 
vicarious sensations show broader differences that extend beyond simple mirroring of 
sensorimotor consequences. Self-Other Theory (see Ward & Banissy, 2015) provides a 
potential framework from which to understand these broader differences in self-awareness 
experienced by conscious vicarious pain responders. While the present results provide novel 
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insight into the broader phenomenal experience of conscious vicarious pain, conclusions 
cannot be drawn regarding causal relationships from this data alone. In the case of 
depersonalisation, a sense of detachment from the bodily self may cause the individual to 
incorporate other-relevant information into the self-concept, leading to the conscious percept 
of pain when observing another person in pain. However, it is also conceivable that the shared 
experience of vicarious pain could lead to a self-other blurring (similar to that induced by 
synchronous touch in the rubber hand and enfacement illusions – Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; 
Tsakiris, 2008), and that this could increase feelings of detachment from the self. Similarly, a 
greater focus on internal bodily states (interoceptive sensibility) could lead to increased 
detection of physical sensations induced by observing pain, leading to a conscious vicarious 
percept. Alternatively, individuals that experience vicarious pain may be more likely to attend 
to bodily states, due to increased sensation from both self- and other-focused stimulation. 
Future aims should be to establish the causal mechanisms underlying the associations between 
depersonalisation, interoceptive sensibility and vicarious pain that are seen here. This could be 
examined by directly manipulating the control of attention towards bodily states, through 
contemplative training for instance, which has been shown to increase interoceptive sensibility 
as measured on the MAIA (Bornemann, Herbert, Mehling & Singer, 2015). Depersonalisation 
is perhaps more difficult to directly manipulate, but future work could attempt to induce 
disconnection from the bodily self through out-of-body illusions. For instance, an illusion 
developed by Guterstam and Ehrsson (2012) allows the viewer to see their own body as if from 
outside of it. The authors show that this experience reduces ownership over the viewer’s own 
body, as indexed by reduced skin conductance response to bodily threat. The impact of these 
manipulations could then be assessed using the VPQ, to clarify causal mechanisms in conscious 
vicarious pain perception. 
Contrary to predictions, no differences in trait anxiety were found between vicarious 
pain responder groups. The current results show that conscious vicarious pain was associated 
with atypicality in certain dimensions of interoceptive sensibility (i.e., Noticing, Emotional 
Awareness, Not-distracting, Body-Listening), while high anxiety was associated with low 
interoceptive sensibility in a different set of dimensions (Trusting, Self-Regulation). These 
results contrast with some previous reports, which have suggested that anxiety scores on the 
STAI-T are negatively correlated with all eight dimensions of interoceptive sensibility on the 
MAIA (Mehling et al., 2012), and suggest that trust in one’s own body sensations, as well as 
the ability to reduce psychological distress in relation to these sensations, are most crucial for 
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reducing anxiety. In these dimensions conscious vicarious pain responders were similar to non-
responders. This provides a potential explanation for why anxiety was not increased in the 
conscious vicarious pain responder groups. This finding does contrast with previous evidence 
of heightened anxiety in conscious vicarious pain (Nazarewicz et al., 2015; Young et al., 2017). 
However, in this work, an alternative measure of anxiety, the anxiety component of the 
Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS-Anxiety; Antony et al., 1998; Lovibond & Lovibond, 
1995) was used. This scale contains items such as “I was aware of dryness of my mouth”, 
which involve an element of bodily awareness, in contrast with STAI-T items such as “I feel 
nervous and restless” (Spielberger, 1983). While both the STAI-T and DASS-Anxiety are 
negatively correlated with the Trusting subscale of the MAIA, the DASS-Anxiety is also 
positively correlated with Noticing (Valenzuela-Moguillansky, Reyes-Reyes & Gaete, 2017), 
which is here shown to be elevated in conscious vicarious pain responders. It is possible that 
higher DASS-Anxiety scores are found in the conscious vicarious pain group due to this 
interoceptive component. 
The limitations of the current study should be noted. Measurement of the trait 
dimensions of interest relied on subjective reports on self-report scales, which can be 
susceptible to bias. For instance, since some questionnaire items relate to mental health, social 
desirability bias may have influenced participants’ responses. The fact that all data for this 
experiment was collected online provides some protection against this bias. No participant 
came into contact with the experimenter at any point, providing an extra layer of anonymity, 
and because of this, online tests are thought to promote more honest self-disclosure (Joinson, 
1999). However, the fact that all data analysed in this experiment was collected in one online 
questionnaire could present an issue with common-method variance. There is a concern that 
when the same method (e.g. online questionnaire) is used to assess different variables, this will 
lead to systematic error variance that is shared between the variables and attributable to the 
measurement method rather than the constructs of interest (Podsakoff et al., 2003). For this 
reason, Harman’s (1976) single factor test was used to estimate common-method variance in 
the data set. The results indicated that this potential source of bias is not a cause for concern in 
the current experiment.  
Evidence of atypical bodily self-awareness in conscious vicarious pain responders 
provides implications for understanding the mechanisms underlying vicarious perception and 
empathy in typical adults. For instance, the Self-Other Model of Empathy (Bird & Viding, 
2014) proposes a self-other switch, necessary to direct attention away from the self and towards 
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another person’s state, in order to understand and empathise with that person. Current results 
support this mechanism, indicating that when an observer experiences disconnection from the 
self (as in depersonalisation), vicarious perception may be heightened. Bird and Viding suggest 
that for typical adults, the default state of the self-other switch is towards the self (leading to 
egocentric bias). Heightened depersonalisation at a trait level in conscious vicarious pain 
responders indicates that for these groups the self-other switch is biased away from the self. 
This evidence suggests that maintaining a coherent and stable sense of the bodily self may be 
necessary for down-regulating excessive empathy and vicarious perception of pain, an ability 
most clearly displayed by medical professionals (Cheng et al., 2007; Decety, Yang and Cheng, 
2010). Of further relevance to models of empathy, increased interoceptive sensibility and 
decreased externally-oriented thinking here indicated a greater focus on the internal emotional 
and bodily signals of the self and others in conscious vicarious pain responders. Focusing on 
internal emotional and physical states may therefore be a factor enhancing conscious vicarious 
perception of pain in typical adults. Indeed, interoceptive accuracy has previously been linked 
to increased empathy for pain (Grynberg & Pollatos, 2015). The current evidence extends 
hypotheses based on this finding, suggesting that an internal focus across both one’s own and 
other bodies may be linked to variation in vicarious pain perception. 
With growing evidence of broader differences in the representation of the self and 
others in conscious vicarious pain and MTS (e.g. Santiesteban et al., 2015; Cioffi, Banissy & 
Moore, 2016; also see Ward & Banissy, 2015 for review) the extent to which these experiences 
can be considered a form of synaesthesia has been called into question (e.g. Fitzgibbon et al., 
2012; Rothen & Meier, 2013). In synaesthesia, an experience in one sensory modality 
automatically triggers a percept in a second, unrelated sensory modality. At the surface level, 
MTS and conscious vicarious pain share these features, with touch or pain sensations 
automatically elicited by a visual stimulus. However, the causal mechanisms underlying 
conscious vicarious perception and other forms of synaesthesia appear to differ. Evidence 
described here shows that individuals with conscious vicarious pain also experience a general 
sense of detachment from their own bodies, and increased attention towards bodily states other 
than touch and pain. This indicates that these individuals’ experiences are not limited to a pain 
sensation induced by a visual stimulus, but that conscious vicarious pain and MTS instead 
reflect broader atypicality in self-other representation, in line with Self-Other Theory (Ward & 
Banissy, 2015). This atypical representation is thought to elevate vicarious perception from the 
unconscious representation observed in neurotypicals (e.g., activity in regions associated with 
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the first-hand experience of pain when viewing another person in pain, see Keysers et al., 2010; 
Lamm et al., 2011) to conscious sensation. Unlike other variants of synaesthesia (e.g., 
grapheme-colour), MTS and conscious vicarious pain therefore appear to reflect a heightened 
example of typical vicarious perception. In this case, as Meier, Lunke and Rothen (2015) argue, 
conscious vicarious perception may not provide a strong model for synaesthesia generally, but 
instead inform models of vicarious perception and social cognition in typical adults, as 
discussed above.  
In summary, the current study demonstrates increased depersonalisation and 
interoceptive sensibility, and decreased externally-oriented thinking, in Sensory-Localised and 
Affective-Generalised conscious vicarious pain responders compared with non-responders. 
The results indicate a role for bodily self-awareness in modulating vicarious perception of pain, 
and highlight the need for theoretical accounts of vicarious perception to take a broader focus, 
beyond sensorimotor mirroring. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Pearson’s coefficients for correlations between the self-report measures. 
Self-Report Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
 
1.CDS 
 
- 
            
              
2.STAI-T -.10 -            
              
TAS              
3. Describing Feelings .24*** .48*** -           
4. Identifying Feelings .28*** .62*** .63*** -          
5. Externally-Oriented Thinking -.10     .12 .27*** .11 -         
              
MAIA              
6. Noticing  .17** .05 -.01 .09 -.18** -        
7. Not-Distracting -.25***  -.04 -.22*** -.15** -.05 - .16** -       
8. Not-Worrying -.13* -.06 .09 -.12* .14* - .10 .02 -      
9. Attention Regulation .11 -.15 -.09 -.14* -.08 .46*** -.19** .02 -     
10. Emotional Awareness .26*** -.03 -.02 .19** -.21*** .57*** -.21*** -.21*** .39*** -    
11. Self-Regulation .04 -.46*** -.20** -.14* -.16** .35*** -.09 .03 .52*** .45*** -   
12. Body Listening .13* -.17 -.13* -.00 -.20** .44** -.11 -.13* .42*** .57*** .54*** -  
13. Trusting -.01 -.68*** -.23*** - .33*** -.10 .21** -.01 .09 .38*** .19** .52*** .38*** - 
*p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1: Self-reported depersonalisation in each of the pain responder groups. Higher CDS 
total scores were found for Sensory-Localised and Affective-Generalised responders than for 
non-responders (* p < .05; N/R, Non-Responder; S/L, Sensory-Localised Responder; A/G, 
Affective-Generalised Responder). Error bars represent +/- 1 S.E.M. 
 
Figure 2: Scores on MAIA subscales where a significant effect of pain responder group was 
found. Higher interoceptive sensibility was found on the Noticing and Emotional Awareness 
subscales for Sensory-Localised and Affective-Generalised responders compared with non-
responders. Higher scores were also found on the Body Listening subscale, and lower scores 
on the Not-Distracting subscale, for Affective-Generalised responders compared with non-
responders (* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; N/R, Non-Responder; S/L, Sensory-Localised 
Responder; A/G, Affective-Generalised Responder). Error bars represent +/- 1 S.E.M. 
 
Figure 3: Scores on each subscale of the TAS in each pain responder group. Lower externally-
oriented thinking was found for Sensory-Localised and Affective-Generalised responders 
compared with non-responders. No significant effects of responder group were found on the 
other subscales (* p < .05, ** p < .01; N/R, Non-Responder; S/L, Sensory-Localised 
Responder; A/G, Affective-Generalised Responder; Identifying, Identifying Feelings; 
Describing, Describing Feelings; EOT, Externally-Oriented Thinking). Error bars represent 
+/- 1 S.E.M. 
 
